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This paper investigates the extent to which the health 
systems of the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, and Kosovo) have 
succeeded in providing financial protection against 
adverse health events. The authors examine disparities in 
health status, healthcare utilization, and out-of-pocket 
payments for healthcare (including informal payments), 
and explore the impact of healthcare expenditures on 
household economic status and poverty. Methodologies 
include (i) generating a descriptive assessment of health 
and healthcare disparities across socioeconomic groups, 
(ii) measuring the incidence and intensity of catastrophic 
This paper—a product of the Health, Nutrition and Population Division, Human Development Department of the Europe 
and Central Asia Region—is part of a larger effort in the department to understand issues of efficiency, sustainability and 
equity of health financing in the countries of the Western Balkans. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the 
Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at cbredenkamp@worldbank.org and mgragnolati@
worldbank.org.
healthcare payments, (iii) examining the effect of out-of-
pocket payments on poverty headcount and poverty gap 
measures, and (iv) running sets of country-specific probit 
regressions to model the relationship between health 
status, healthcare utilization, and poverty. On balance, 
the findings show that the impact of health expenditures 
on household economic wellbeing and poverty is most 
severe in Albania and Kosovo, while Montenegro is 
striking for the financial protection that the health system 
seems to provide. Data are drawn from Living Standards 
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 1. Introduction 
 
The health sectors of the countries of the Western Balkans are all undergoing major reforms. One 
of the major challenges is to generate sufficient revenue to provide high quality healthcare, while 
still protecting households from incurring too onerous a financial burden in terms of healthcare 
payments. 
 
The financial implications of ill health can be severe and major illness is widely acknowledged to 
be one of the most sizeable and least predictable shocks to the economic well-being of 
households. It imposes both a direct cost, in terms of the price of accessing healthcare, and an 
indirect cost, in terms of the loss of income associated with reduced labor supply and 
productivity. Since out-of-pocket payments are the most important means of financing health care 
in most developing countries, large and unpredictable health payments can expose households to 
considerable financial risk. In the absence of an adequate system of social protection, illness can 
take a large toll on household well-being: resource-poor households may be compelled to trade 
the future welfare of all its members against current access to healthcare for one of them, or opt 
for inappropriate, ineffective care or an insufficient quantity of care, and in so doing, risk a 
vicious circle of poverty and illness (Gertler and Gruber 2002).  
 
The objective of this paper is to assess the extent to which the current health systems of the 
countries of the Western Balkans are able to protect households from the impoverishing effects of 
adverse health events. Recent household surveys from Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo
1 are used to estimate the effect of healthcare expenditures on 
economic status and poverty, as well as to explore economic inequalities in health status, 
healthcare utilization and healthcare expenditure. 
 
The evidence of the effects of healthcare expenditure on consumption and poverty in low- and 
middle-income countries has been growing over the past decade. Gertler and Gruber (2002), for 
instance, studied the impact of health shocks on households’ consumption patterns in Indonesia, 
providing evidence that illness reduced labor supply and household income. Similarly Wagstaff 
(2005) finds evidence that health shocks are associated with a reduction in consumption in 
Vietnam, in particular for uninsured and better-off households. Dercon and Krishnan (2000) show 
that in Ethiopia the consumption risks associated with health shocks are not borne equally by all 
household members. In addition, estimates are available for at least six Latin American countries
2 
(Baeza and Packard 2005), China (Lindelow and Wagstaff, 2005), Thailand (Limwattananon 
2007), and fourteen Asian countries and territories
3 (Van Doorslaer et al. 2007). A recent WHO 
article, using survey data from 89 countries, finds that 3% of households in low-income countries, 
1.8% of households in middle-income countries and 0.6% of households in high-income countries 
incur catastrophic health expenditures (Xu et al. 2007)
4. To the best of our knowledge, the 
estimates presented here are the first available for the Western Balkans. 
 
                                                 
1 Kosovo is a province of Serbia, administered by the United Nations, under UNSC resolution 1244. For the purposes 
of this paper, it is treated as a separate unit of analysis. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was excluded 
from the analysis because its last LSMS-type household survey was conducted in 1996. Since then, only household 
budget surveys have been completed but they do not contain the type of health expenditure data needed for comparative 
analysis. 
2 These include Argentina, Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, Honduras and Mexico. 
3 These include, among others, Bangladesh, China, India, Nepal, Vietnam, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Malaysia and Kyrgyz 
Republic. 
4 They consider catastrophic expenditure as having occurred when a household spends 40% of its capacity to pay 
(defined as total spending minus estimated food needs) on out-of-pocket health payments.  
2.  A model of health related behavior and household wellbeing 
 
In this section we model the agent behavior using a simplified utility model that can be traced 
back to Grossman’s (1972) seminal model of demand for health. We assume that an individual’s 
(or a household’s) welfare depends on labor supply, L, the consumption of purchased goods, C, 
health status, H, and is conditioned on other observable characteristics (such as schooling and 
family background), Z, as well as unobserved characteristics including tastes,μ . 
  
) , , , , ( μ Z H L C U U =        ( 1 )  
 
Allocations are constrained by budget and time. Suppose that the individual works for a wage, w, 
and that assets and non-labor income is I, the full income constraint is 
  
I wL H p C p h c + = +      ( 2 )  
 
where Pc and Pn are the prices of non-health and health consumption goods respectively. 
 
If the latter is the only constraint and λ is the marginal utility of income, the first-order condition 
with respect to health status leads to the standard relationship where the marginal utility of health 










Accordingly, a person determines his optimal stock of health capital by equating the marginal 
efficiency of this capital to its user cost in terms of the price of gross investment. One prediction 
of the model is that each person has a negatively inclined demand curve for health capital which 
shifts upward in response to increases in the wage rate. Thus, ceteris paribus (i.e. for given age, 
level of education, health taste or inherited health stock etc), those who experience adverse health 
events are willing to incur out-of-pocket expenditures to improve their health status, and those 
who are economically better-off demand a larger optimal stock of health.  
 
Assuming that an individual’s real wage, w,  is equal to her costlessly observed marginal product, 
the standard earning function varies with health status, H, other individual traits, S, including 
schooling human capital, family background and local community infrastructure, and 
unobservable factors, α , such as ability or school quality, and random fluctuations,  :  w e
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If we include the wage constraint in the allocation problem (i.e. the individual maximizes (1) 















  3At a given health cost, if health status rises wages, then the shadow price of health care declines, 
inducing a greater demand for health. It has been argued that there are nonlinearities in this link 
as the shadow price decreases more for people in worse health (Strauss and Thomas 1998). This 
entails important distributional consequences if the poor are most likely to be below the health 
threshold level. 
 
By inverting the last equation we obtain a reduced form demand function for health care: 
 
) , , , , , ( α μ S Z p p H H h c =  
 
which implies that the demand for health will depend on its cost, but also on non-health 
consumption, individual and household characteristics (such as schooling and family 
background), and unobserved characteristics. The presence of α in both the wage function and 
the health demand function captures the simultaneity problem that is central to the difficulty in 
disentangling the causal effects of health on productivity
5. Therefore, a reduced form estimation 
cannot provide an unambiguous determination of whether health does influence economic well-
being. However, it does provide an indication of the (total) effect of health prices and the health 
environment on household wellbeing.  
 
Our purpose in this paper is not to tackle the causality issue, but rather to shed some light on the 
link between health and poverty in the Western Balkans. We do this by taking into account the 
main socio-demographic variables that affect health care demand. It should be noted that 
variables like age and education enter the theoretical model through their impact on either the 
cost of health capital or its marginal productivity. Thus, there are important implications to be 
tested concerning the effects of socio-demographic characteristics, along with economic ones, on 
health status and the utilization of health care
6.  
 




Data are drawn from recent household surveys, either official Living Standards and Measurement 
Surveys (LSMS) or surveys that are considered LSMS equivalents.  The LSMS surveys are multi-
topic household surveys that include data on a wide range of demographic and socio-economic 
characteristics. The typical health module provides information on (i) health status, (ii) the 
utilization of health services, (iii) health expenditures, and (iv) insurance status. The depth of the 
health section varies somewhat across the surveys considered, with the most detailed information 
available for Albania and the least detailed for Montenegro, but an effort has been made to recode 
data so that variables are as homogenous as possible across data sets.   
 
                                                 
5 On the other hand, the extent to which households are able to insure consumption against illness depends on the 
ability to reduce the incidence and severity of illness shocks. For example, as argued by Gertler and Gruber (2002), 
households may be more able to effectively insure against frequently-occurring, small health shocks than large rare 
illnesses.  
6 Indeed, one prediction of Grossman’s (1972) model is that if the rate of depreciation of health increases with age, at 
least after some point in the life cycle, then the quantity of health capital demanded will decline over the life cycle. At 
the same time, provided the elasticity of the marginal efficiency of health capital is less than unity, expenditure on 
health care will rise with age. 
  4Data for Albania are from 2005, for Bosnia and Herzegovina from 2004, for Montenegro from 
2004, for Serbia from 2003, and for Kosovo from 2000. Sample size, for the sample on which 
there were observations for all variables included in the probit analyses, is 15,434 individual in 
Albania, 2,325 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 8,205 in Montenegro, 7,871 in Serbia, and 16,013 in 
Kosovo. 
 
Throughout the analysis, sample weights are used to produce population estimates at the country-
level.  
 




Health status is a complicated, multi-faceted phenomenon that is measured with substantial error, 
especially when health status is derived from subjective responses by individuals in a sample 
survey. The degree of measurement error may also vary systematically by factors such as the age 
and gender of the respondent and the nature of the illness. In these surveys, health status measures 




Information is available in all surveys on the utilization and costs of different types of health 
services, as well as medicines, although the types of services listed sometimes differs across 
surveys. Also, information on health insurance is not available for Serbia and Kosovo (which has 
no social health insurance scheme).  
 
In most places (i.e. in Albania, Serbia and Kosovo), the questionnaires distinguish between 
formal health payments, transportation costs and informal health expenses. Yet, although specific 
questions were included in the LSMS on both formal charges for consultations and the value of 
unofficial ‘gifts’ (in cash or in kind) made to the medical staff, it is likely that at least some 
respondents may not know whether the formal charges they paid were ‘official’ or not. Under-
estimation of out-of-pocket payments for drugs and medical supplies is less likely because all 
LSMS surveys distinguish between payments for drugs covered under a prescription and other 
drugs.  
 
A last source of heterogeneity across the health modules in the household surveys is the period 
under analysis. Most questions refer to health-related events in the past 4 weeks, but some refer to 
the past 12 or 14 months. An effort has been made to homogenize the time span, but imputed 
figures should be treated with caution because health care utilization due to an acute illness shock 
may vary over time.   
 
There are many approaches to measuring living standards, including direct approaches (e.g. 
income, expenditure, or consumption) and proxy measures (e.g. the construction of asset indices). 
We use total per capita expenditure as the main living standards measure, a decision that is driven 
by data availability. In order to obtain this measure, households are ranked by real total 
expenditure (consisting of all types of consumption by the households including food, non-food, 
utilities and education expenses, as well as the use value of durable goods owned by the 
household), adjusted for the household size. Quintile measures of living standards, in which 
households are classified into five equal-sized per capita consumption quintiles, are also used. 
The concepts “poor” and “non-poor”, when used in this paper, will refer to those below and 
                                                 
7 The actual survey questions on health status, health care utilization and health insurance are given in Table A2. 
  5above the National Poverty Lines calculated in local currency (LCU) by the World Bank Poverty 
Assessment team (and henceforth referred to as the PA poverty line). To facilitate cross-country 
comparisons, the Appendix (Tables A3 and A4) also reports results using the single international 





This paper has three main analytical sections. It commences by examining economic disparities in 
health status and healthcare utilization, using both descriptive statistics and a probit model 
(Section 4). Then, the magnitude of, and disparities in, out-of-pocket payments for healthcare 
(including informal payments) are explored, together with the impact of these payments on 
household economic status and poverty (Section 5). With respect to the latter, two different 
methodologies are used to assess the impact of health spending on poverty: (i) the incidence and 
intensity of catastrophic healthcare payments, and (ii) the effect of out-of-pocket payments on 
poverty headcount and poverty gap measures. Finally, a set of country-specific probit regressions 
are used to model the relationship between health status, healthcare utilization and poverty 
(Section 6). 
 
4. Disparities in health status, healthcare utilization and health insurance coverage  
 
There is substantial cross-country variation in self-reported morbidity, including both chronic and 
acute illness. Table 1 shows that while only 6% of Montenegrins report a chronic health 
condition, about 14% of Albanians, 22% of Serbians, and 25% of people living in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina do. For those countries for which data are available, the pattern of acute morbidity 
reveals a similar ranking, with the lowest incidence of acute illness in Montenegro (7%), followed 
by Albania (8%) and Serbia (14%).  
 
There is substantial variation in the proportion of the population that sought any type of health 
care in the four weeks prior to the survey. As few as 9% of the population of Montenegro sought 
any type of health care in the four weeks prior to the survey, but the figure rises to 14% in 
Albania, hovers around a fifth of the population in Kosovo and Serbia, and reaches almost a third 
of the population in Bosnia and Herzegovina
9. Around 4-5% of people in each country reported 
being hospitalized in the previous year. Healthcare utilization appears to be higher in countries 
with a higher incidence of illness, but since morbidity data is self-reported the causality could lie 
in either direction. Again, rates vary by age and gender, with women more likely to seek medical 
care than men, but gender differentials in health-seeking behavior disappear once differential 
morbidity is controlled for.   
 
As many as 95% of Montenegrin households are covered by health insurance. The figures are 
much lower in Bosnia and Herzegovina (60%) and especially in Albania (37%), despite social 
health insurance schemes.  
 
4.1 Demographic and geographic disparities 
 
Health status varies by age and gender in each country. Not surprisingly, both chronic and acute 
morbidity increase with age. Women generally report higher levels of chronic disease and acute 
                                                 
8 This measure is not available for Kosovo. 
9 Part of the reason why the figure for Montenegro may be lower than for other countries is that the survey was 
conducted only in May, and may be biased downwards by seasonal variations in the incidence of illness. 
  6morbidity than men in the same age group. Yet, male children (under the age of 15 years) in all 
countries generally have a higher reported incidence of both chronic and acute disease than 
females in all countries. One explanation for this finding is that male children have intrinsically 
poorer health status than female children. However, since it is the parent or guardian who reports 
the health status of individuals below 15 years old, an alternative explanation is that the health 
status of young males is systematically perceived more ‘carefully’ than that of female children, 
which may have consequences for female health into adulthood.  
 
Overall, there are only very small differences in reported chronic illness between people living in 
rural areas and people living in urban areas, but the incidence of acute illness is higher in rural 
areas than in urban areas in Albania and Serbia. There are no clear systematic differences in 
health care utilization between urban and rural areas that hold across countries. Utilization of 
outpatient health services appears to be greater among the urban population than the rural 
population. Hospitalization does not vary much across urban and rural area in Albania and 
Montenegro, but in Bosnia and Herzegovina, hospitalization is greater in rural areas, and in 
Kosovo, it is greater in urban areas. Health insurance coverage differs significantly between 
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Table 1 Self-reported morbidity and healthcare utilization by age and gender (%) 
    
Suffers 










care in last 
month** 
Hospitalized 




Men 0-15  2.46 11.65  9.77 2.84  36.10 
 16-64  12.48 4.22  8.46  2.83  33.36 
 65+  55.54 16.65  39.24 9.39  69.80 
Women 0-15  1.68 9.87  8.38 2.06  35.87 
 16-64  15.95 7.84  14.97 5.60  33.42 
 65+  63.72 15.82  43.83 6.81  63.95 
Total   14.38  8.36  13.50  4.04  36.95 
Albania 
Obs. (unweighted)  17,304 17,304  17,304 17,304  17,304 
Men 0-15  3.41  na  15.79 0.00  66.74 
 16-64  15.78  na  17.76 3.23  56.43 
 65+  59.87  na  48.16 11.12  64.32 
Women 0-15  0.00  na  12.61 0.00  70.93 
 16-64  20.30  na  37.46 5.47  60.25 
 65+  76.02  na  54.95 5.59  61.73 
Total   25.37  na  30.73  4.80  59.16 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Obs. (unweighted)  9331 9331  9331  9331  9331 
Men 0-15  5.40 4.60  6.03 Na  93.85 
 16-64  5.50 5.90  7.91 Na  95.68 
 65+  15.00 18.00  15.73 Na  95.26 
Women 0-15  4.80 3.40  7.01 Na  93.01 
 16-64  5.10 6.30  9.05 Na  95.50 
 65+  23.00 23.00  19.98 Na  95.72 
Total   6.30  6.60  8.61  Na  94.95 
Montenegro  
Obs. (unweighted)  8889 8889  8889  8889  8889 
Men 0-15  4.17 11.78  17.37  3.96  Na 
 16-64  15.83 9.94  12.72 2.68  Na 
 65+  56.98 23.56  37.43 11.19  Na 
Women 0-15  2.88 10.26  16.09  2.57  Na 
 16-64  20.54 15.11  21.61 4.66  Na 
 65+  66.75 28.64  44.17 8.51  Na 
Total   22.12  14.35  20.73  4.52  Na 
Serbia 
Obs. (unweighted)  8027 8027  8027  8027  8027 
Men 0-15  na  na  13.79 3.62  Na 
 16-64  na  na  18.33 24.82  Na 
 65+  na  na  5.49 4.83  Na 
Women 0-15  na  na  15.02 3.13  Na 
 16-64  na  na  20.36 21.12  Na 
 65+  na  na  5.72 6.01  Na 
Total   na  na  17.85  4.82  Na 
Kosovo 
Obs. (unweighted)  17917 17917  17917  17917  17917 
* The precise definition of morbidity concepts differs somewhat across survey instruments. Table A2 in the Appendix lists 
the actual questions asked in survey. 
**Percentages refer to the past 4 weeks for all except Bosnia and Herzegovina where they refer to the past 14 months. 
***Percentages refer to the past 12 months for all except Bosnia and Herzegovina where they refer to the past 14 months. 
 
   
Table 2 Self-reported morbidity and health care utilization by urban-rural location (%) 
 
TABLE 2:   




urban  Rural City  Suburban  Rural Urban  Rural  Belgrade 
Other 
urban  Rural Urban  Rural 
Suffers from a  chronic 
illness or disability  14.07 14.46  14.41  30.00  27.00  29.00 6.90  5.30  24.59  20.43  22.48  na na 
Been ill in last 4 weeks  6.92  8.50  8.58  na Na  na 6.90 5.90  11.85 14.44  15.46 na na 
Sought (outpatient) 
medical care in last 
month * 
14.29 14.05  13.07  37.38  42.01  34.45  8.89 7.95  21.86 20.94  20.00 17.82  17.81 
Hospitalized in the last 
year**  3.48 3.87  4.24  5.47  6.81  6.90  na na  4.46 3.97  5.04 5.49  4.21 
People with health 
insurance  57.34 51.02  26.21  68.20  69.66 53.55  95.13  94.60  na Na  na na  na 
*Percentages refer to the past 4 weeks for all except Bosnia and Herzegovina where they refers to the past 14 months. 
**Percentages refer to the past 12 months for all except Bosnia and Herzegovina where they refers to the past 14 months. 
 4.2 Economic disparities 
 
In Table 3, the relationship between the economic status of the household, on the one hand, and 
health status and health seeking behavior, on the other hand, is examined. One cannot generalize 
about the relationship between economic status and healthcare utilization. While in Serbia and 
Kosovo, there is not much variation in hospital utilization across consumption quintiles, in 
Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina healthcare utilization falls slightly as economic status 
increases. Utilization of treatment for acute care is more closely related to economic status than 
utilization of hospital care, and in all countries utilization of outpatient care tends to increases as 
economic status improves. The extent of variation across quintiles differs from place to place, 
though: it is very small in Albania, in Serbia and Kosovo, but nearly doubles in Montenegro.  
 
In Albania, Serbia and Montenegro (i.e. the three countries for which acute illness data are 
available) the incidence of acute illness falls as economic status rises, in general, but in Serbia 
and Montenegro, the incidence of acute illness rises sharply again in the richest quintile where a 
very high incidence of illness is reported. This result could be explained by the possibility that 
those in the richest quintile are more knowledgeable about their health status because they can 
afford to have their illnesses diagnosed.  There is no clear variation in the incidence of chronic 
illness across quintiles. This may be the direct consequence of the difficulties of access to 
preventive health services by poor people, leaving them more vulnerable to illness. Yet, factors 
that influence illness perception and health seeking behavior are complex. One argument 
proposed in the literature is that the very poor, lacking the resources to access medical care easily, 
define illness more narrowly than those able to afford treatment (Falkingham, 2004). The poor 
may also defer health care utilization until their illness is severe. 
 
There is a very strong direct relationship between economic status and health insurance in all 
countries for which the information is available: a greater percentage of people in the upper 
quintiles have health insurance than in the lower quintiles. 
 
Table 3 Self-reported morbidity and health care utilization, by economic status (%) 
    Quintiles of per capita consumption 
    Poorest  2 3 4 Richest   
Suffer chronic illness  13.41 15.39 14.29 15.07 14.30 
Suffer acute illness   8.69 8.69 8.42 7.69 7.65 
Sought medical assistance / 
outpatient*  11.75 15.24 13.58 14.05 13.86 
Hospitalized in the last year**  4.38 4.47 3.87 3.54 3.34 
Albania 
People with health insurance  27.77 34.79 43.01 42.37 47.10 
         
Suffer chronic illness  26.00 24.00 25.00 28.00 26.00 
Sought medical assistance / 
outpatient*  22.34 26.81 32.46 34.29 39.61 
Hospitalized in the last year**  4.41 4.78 4.55 5.98 4.20 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina  
People with health insurance  47.84 56.87 59.05 62.35 71.72 
         
Suffer chronic illness  5.30 5.10 7.50 5.10 8.50 
Suffer acute illness   8.00 8.00 6.50 4.10 7.20 
Sought medical assistance / 
outpatient*  7.50 8.12 8.27 5.67 14.30 
Montenegro  
People with health insurance  95.22 94.57 93.22 94.10 97.98 
         
Serbia   Suffer chronic illness  21.34 22.76 24.13 20.80 21.55   11
Suffer acute illness   15.02 15.11 13.22 12.05 16.37 
Sought medical assistance / 
outpatient*  18.88 20.48 21.79 20.56 22.07 
Hospitalized in the last year**  4.67 3.94 5.23 4.57 4.17 
         
Sought medical assistance / 
outpatient*  17.75 16.44 17.42 18.42 19.73  Kosovo  
Hospitalized in the last year**  4.68 4.51 4.26 4.82 5.42 
*Percentages refer to the past 4 weeks for all except Bosnia and Herzegovina where they refer to the past 14 months. 
**Percentages refer to the past 12 months for all except Bosnia and Herzegovina where they refer to the past 14 
months. 
 
An examination of the relationship between economic status and the type of health care utilized 
(Table 4) shows that, with occasional exceptions, the poor systematically use less of almost every 
type of health service than those who are better-off. These services include both public and 
private care, such as public ambulatory care, providers of alternative medicine, inpatient hospital 
care, private doctors, private nurses and dentists. A noteworthy exception is Montenegro where a 
greater percentage of the poor than the rich utilize hospital care, but this could be the result of the 
fact that the hospital care variable for Montenegro also includes outpatient care, for which private 
doctors are a substitute.  With the exception of Montenegro, the consumption of non-prescription 
medicine is also significantly higher among the non-poor than the poor; for some countries, the 
magnitude of difference is substantial, e.g. in Serbia where consumption is double. Table A3 in 
the Appendix shows the distribution of health care utilization by poverty status, using the single 
international poverty line. 
 
  




Herzegovina Montenegro  Serbia  Kosovo 
 Non-poor  Poor 
Non-
poor  Poor Non-poor  Poor Non-poor Poor  Non-poor  Poor 
Public ambulatory  9.53**  8.28**  36.67***  27.96*** 70.41  61.6  22.74** 17.03**  15.98**  14.70** 
Hospital (outpatient)  3.54  3.58  na na na na  na na  na  na 
Popular doctor/alternative medicine 0.37**  0.16**  2.44***  0.95***  na na  1.01 0.58  na na 
Private doctor  1.39*  0.99*  8.39***  4.34*** 3.41  0.54  2.37***  0.48*** 2.83  2.88 
Private nurse  1.38  1.41 0.67 0.26 1.08  0.00 na  na  1.00 1.15 
Health service abroad  na na  na  na  na  na  0.13 0.00  na na 
Other  na na  15.49*** 10.78*** 3.90*  0.00  na na  2.75 2.84 
Non-prescription medicines  16.32***  12.40***  42.98*** 36.49*** 0.02**  0.01**  22.48*** 10.24***  10.28***  8.52*** 
Hospital (inpatient)*  3.93  4.37  4.99 3.93 21.20***  37.86***  5.09 3.94  5.1  4.69 
Dentist 22.03***  12.44***  28.13***  19.00*** 0.02***  0.00***  7.54***  2.72***  na  na 
                   
PA Poverty Line 
5145,33 
New Lek/pc /per month 
2223.146  
KM/pc/ per year 
 
90.34 
Euro/pc/ per month 
4111.31 
Dinars/pc/ per month 
106.689 
DM/pc/per month 
Note: *In Montenegro, the data include outpatient care at hospitals. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 5. Out-of-pocket expenditures on health care and their effect on poverty 
 
Out-of-pocket expenditures constitute a fairly large share of total health care expenditure in the 
Western Balkans. The magnitude of out-of-pocket expenditure is driven by factors such as the 
level of co-payments, the prevalence of informal payments, the use of private providers and 
coverage by social health insurance. In some countries, and for some population groups, the 
magnitude of these expenditures is sufficient to have a substantial impoverishing effect on 
households. 
 
5.1 Geographic and economic disparities in out-of-pocket expenditures 
 
The available data enable one to distinguish between expenditure at different types of health care 
facilities, such as public, private, inpatient and out-patient, and also between different types of 
expenditures, namely general health care expenditure (including primarily medicines, along with 
treatment and laboratory costs), transportation expenditure and informal expenditures (which are 
unofficial, but typically not voluntary)
10.   
 
The amount paid for health care services varies across types of expenditures and regions (see 
Table 5). While publicly-provided health care is generally less expensive than private care, health 
care expenditure at public facilities can be considerable, especially for poor people living in rural 
or remote regions. On average, people living in rural areas spend more on public healthcare and 
inpatient hospitalization than people living in urban areas. Moreover, people living outside the 
city bear significantly higher transportation costs and make larger informal payments.  
 
Several factors may explain the difference in public health expenditure by people in urban areas 
compared to those in the countryside. Data presented earlier in this paper (see Table 2) showed 
that in all countries (except Bosnia and Herzegovina), people living in rural areas have higher 
rates of inpatient utilization. Higher out-of-pocket payments in rural areas could also be explained 
by the fact that insurance coverage tends to be lower in rural areas, at least for the countries for 
which data are available. Another possibility is that people in urban areas have lower health 
expenditure in the public sector because they use private facilities instead – indeed, data show 
that people in urban areas spend more on private healthcare, on average, than those in rural areas. 
Structural factors affecting the availability of healthcare and the costs of healthcare inputs may 




                                                 
10 Distinguishing between formal and informal payments for health services is challenging. Although the LSMS 
includes specific questions to distinguish between official charges for consultations and the value of unofficial ‘gifts’ 
made to the medical staff, it is likely that some respondents could have been unclear whether ‘charges’ demanded by 
medical personnel prior the consultation were ‘official’ (i.e. legally sanctioned) or not (alternatively, people report 
paying an official fee, which is likely to be in fact unofficial 
11 In Albania for example, at the beginning of the transition, many doctors left rural and remote areas attracted by more 
lucrative opportunities in the cities, especially Tirana. Moreover, the financing of the whole system is set up so as to 
pay for the salaries of all doctors, nurses, midwives and paramedics in some regions but not in others; the same holds 
true for insurance. This results in large variations in healthcare costs across regions (see World Bank 2003). Table 5 Health care expenditure by region, among those who seek care 
 Albania    Bosnia and Herzegovina*    Montenegro    Serbia    Kosovo 
  (monthly averages in New Lek)    (monthly averages in KM)   
(monthly averages in 
Euro)    (monthly averages in Dinars)   




urban  Rural ALL    City 
Sub-
urban  Rural ALL   Urban Rural ALL   Belgrade 
Other 
urban  Rural ALL    Urban  Rural  ALL 
Exp. on  
public 
providers 




4201.27 2106.41 1706.20 2025.59   17.20 10.64  12.23 14.76   10.77 6.39  9.80   1694.30 3583.94  2420.24  2738.76    58.77 47.84  55.10 
Exp. for 
health abroad  Na Na Na Na   na  Na  na  na    na  Na  na    145.83 16.40 62.54 62.59   na Na  na 
TOT exp. for   
out-patient 
visits 
2507.37 2294.00 2547.52 2467.92  7.72  7.06  11.51 8.61   10.85  9.23  10.50  848.79  930.36 1084.39  975.74   45.07 37.38  42.17 




4630.09 2074.24 2489.24 2598.41  7.65  26.69  11.97 12.82  2.65  7.96  4.37   1003.89  301.80 292.22 435.68   39.03 23.53  33.04 
Exp. for 
medicines w.p  593.30 458.87 418.92 449.88   4.98 3.55  3.09 4.18   5.73  6.10 5.86   432.87  347.33 420.47 392.63   13.11 11.49  12.45 
Exp. for 
dentist  466.50 415.52 276.92 350.18   4.70 3.33 6.55 4.90    19.39  22.38  20.22  2500.40  1583.45 1121.87 1613.74  na Na  na 
By typology:                                      
General  exp.  1446.66 1179.42 1164.29 1207.35  na na  na na  11.10  10.98 11.07  1038.30  900.70  876.22 922.86   37.12 28.51  33.81 
Informal  exp. 62.94  153.09 155.45 141.25   na na  na na   na na  na    16.91  39.36 12.63 23.19   0.50 0.82  0.62 
Transportation 
exp.  50.47 41.88 134.65  95.09   na na  na na  5.62  4.19  5.24   89.20  91.19  247.98 157.15   7.42  6.49 7.07 
                                      
TOT health 
exp.  1542.60 1337.46 1388.64 1395.01  9.70  10.08  11.61 10.31  10.85  10.69 10.80  1090.93  967.84 1052.58  1026.53    43.44 34.24  39.90 
Note: *These are imputed figures as the Bosnia and Herzegovina questionnaire on health expenses is based on the previous 14 months.  
Most of the health expenditure incurred by those who seek care consists of general medical 
expenses. For poor households, transportation costs and informal payments represent a relatively 
big share of total health expenditure, and constitute a larger share among the poor than among the 
rich (except in Montenegro). The share of informal payments in highest in Albania where 
households at the poorest end of the income distribution pay, on average, 8% of their total health 
expenditures in the form of informal payments compared to 4% in the richest quintile. In Serbia, 
the rich pay a greater share of their health expenditure as informal expenses than the poor do, but 
the share of expenditure that the poor allocate to transportation expenditure is twice that which 
the rich do.  Kosovo is the only place where households pay more or less the same across the 
income distribution.  
 
Table 6 Health care expenditure on general, informal and transportation expenses, as percentage of 
total health expenditure, by economic status 
    Quintiles of real per capita consumption 
    Poorest  2 3 4 Richest 
General  expenses  87% 88% 91% 92% 92% 
Informal  expenses  8% 6% 5% 5% 4%  Albania 
Transportation  expenses  6% 7% 4% 3% 2% 
         
General  expenses  100%  99% 99% 97% 91% 
Informal expenses  Na na na na na  Montenegro  
Transportation  expenses  0% 1% 1% 3% 9% 
         
General  expenses  58% 69% 71% 74% 77% 
Informal  expenses  1% 1% 1% 1% 3%  Serbia  
Transportation  expenses  28% 22% 14% 13% 13% 
         
General  expenses  81% 80% 81% 80% 82% 
Informal  expenses  2% 2% 1% 2% 1%  Kosovo  
Transportation  expenses  17% 15% 17% 17% 15% 
         
 
 
Total health expenditure can be considerable especially for the poor. In Table 7, we present health 
expenditure as a percentage of total gross expenditure, by per capita consumption quintile
12. On 
average, households belonging to the bottom fifth of the consumption distribution spend less in 
level but more in percentage terms on total health care (including transportation costs and 
informal payments) than households in the richest quintiles. In Albania the poorest spend about 
half of what the richest spend on health care, but these expenses represent twice the share of total 
expenditure. In Kosovo, as well, the highest burden of health expenditure is borne by the poorest 
quintile of the population: the poor spend about the same as the rich for health care, but this 
expense represents 13 percent of their total consumption against 4 percent for the richest. By 
contrast, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, the poor spend much less than the 
rich on health care and the share of total household expenditure devoted to healthcare is more 
similar across quintiles.  
                                                 
12 There are methodological issues concerning the construction of both the consumption aggregate and per capita 
monthly health expenditure. The former is given in the datasets but the methodology to construct the figure may differ 
across countries; the latter is constructed by the aggregation of individual responses at household level and thereafter 
adjusted for the value for the household size. Total gross consumption is the sum of the two.  
Table 7 Health-care expenditure as % of gross expenditure* (among those who seek care), by quintile 
  Albania    Bosnia and Herzegovina 
  Poorest  2 3 4 Richest  TOT    Poorest  2 3 4  Richest  TOT 
General  official  exp  7% 6% 6% 5% 4% 5%   na na na na  na  na 
Informal  exp.  1% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0%   na na na na  na  na 
Transport  exp.  1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%   na na na na  na  Na 
TOT health exp.  8%  7%  7%  5%  4%  6%    2.3%  1.6%  1.6%  1.5% 1.2% 1.7% 
                  
Health exp (monthly, pc)  449.68 665.99 737.28 748.23 939.80 709.58   4.16 3.95 5.07 6.49  7.71  5.1992 
Tot gross exp. (monthly, pc)  4708.04  7182.29  9354.40  12171.27 20008.06 10755.93  157.99 231.65 301.82 398.29  643.05  315.9 
Tot net exp. (excluding health),  pc  4258.37  6516.30  8617.12  11423.04 19068.27 10046.36  153.83 227.71 296.75 391.80  635.35  310.7 
  Montenegro    Serbia 
Continued:  Poorest 2  3  4  Richest  TOT    Poorest  2 3 4  Richest  TOT 
General official exp  0.8% 0.8% 1.2% 1.2% 1.1% 1.0%   3.8% 3.9% 4.3% 2.8%  3.3%  3.6% 
Informal exp.  na na na na na na   0.03% 0.01% 0.02% 0.02%  0.07%  0.03% 
Transport exp.  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%    0.62% 0.57% 0.36% 0.28%  0.18%  0.41% 
TOT health exp.  0.8%  0.8%  1.2%  1.2%  1.1% 1.1%   4.4% 4.4% 4.6% 3.1%  3.6%  4.1% 
                  
Health exp (monthly, pc)  0.74  1.08  2.16  3.73 4.72 2.81   216.99  350.19 483.55 372.16  703.26  417.33 
Tot gross exp. (monthly, pc)  84.81  131.33  174.34 229.35 398.28 225.69   3912.35  6134.71 8190.05 10508.48 17548.36 9022.11 
Tot net exp. (excluding health), pc  84.07  130.24 172.17 225.62 393.56 222.87   3695.35 5784.52 7706.50 10136.33 16845.10 8604.78 
  Kosovo              
Continued:  Poorest 2  3  4  Richest  TOT            
General  official  exp  11%  8% 6% 5% 3% 7%              
Informal  exp.  0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%              
Transport  exp.  2% 1% 1% 1% 0% 1%              
TOT health exp.  13%  9%  7%  6%  4%  8%               
                  
Health exp (monthly, pc)  12.14  10.14 10.7  10.09 11.21 10.88              
Tot gross exp. (monthly, pc)  63.47  92.59  120.42 157.77 272.66 141.71              
Tot net exp. (excluding health), pc  51.34  82.46  109.71 147.69 261.45 130.83              
*Total per capita health expenditure was added to total per capita household expenditure to obtain gross expenditure figures. However, the consumption quintile distribution does not include 
health expenditure 5.2 Catastrophic health care payments 
 
Illness can induce a sizable and unpredictable shock to a household’s living standards (Wagstaff and 
van Doorslaer  2003). In order to explore the financial impact of healthcare expenditures on 
households, we examine the extent of catastrophic expenditure on healthcare. This involves measuring 
the extent to which health costs incurred exceed or fall short of different threshold levels, i.e. the 
degree of ‘catastrophe’ experience by a household, and the impact on poverty measures
13.  
 
Table 8 presents the incidence (headcount) and the intensity (gap) of catastrophic out-of-pocket 
payments. The headcount is the percentage of individuals whose health care costs, expressed as a 
proportion of income, exceed a given discretionary fraction of their income, z; the mean gap is the 
average amount by which payments as a proportion of income exceed the threshold z. The incidence 
and intensity of the occurrence, though, are related through the mean positive gap (MPG) which is 
defined as the gap over the headcount




Table 8 Catastrophic impact of out-of-pocket payment – at various threshold levels 
  Out-of-pocket health expenditure  Threshold level z 
  (as % of tot expenditure per capita)  5%  10%  15%  25% 
        
Headcount  36.55% 20.79% 12.58% 5.12% 
Mean gap  3.58% 2.19% 1.36% 0.52%  Albania 
Mean positive gap  9.79% 10.53%  10.81%  10.16% 
        
Headcount  7.83% 3.10% 1.29% 0.35% 
Mean gap  0.47% 0.21% 0.12% 0.04% 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Mean positive gap  6.00% 6.77% 9.30% 11.43% 
        
Headcount  5.84% 1.14% 0.70% 0.15% 
Mean gap  0.23% 0.12% 0.07% 0.04%  Montenegro 
Mean positive gap  3.94% 10.53%  10.00%  26.67% 
        
Headcount  23.83% 12.22% 7.64%  3.52% 
Mean gap  2.28% 1.44% 0.97% 0.46%  Serbia 
Mean positive gap  9.58% 11.76%  12.67%  13.12% 
        
Headcount  44.73% 26.32% 15.35% 6.73% 
Mean  gap  4.59% 2.87% 1.86% 0.83%  Kosovo 
Mean positive gap  10.26%  10.90%  12.08%  12.29% 
 
 
The table shows that in Albania, for instance, as much as 5% of the sample recorded out-of-pocket 
payments (as proportion of income) that exceeded 25% of their pre-payment income, with an average 
degree of 0.5%. Decreasing the threshold level to 10% raises the proportion of the population with 
catastrophic payments to almost 21%, while the mean gap rises to 2%. As expected, both the incidence 
                                                 
13 To do so, we follow the methodology outlined in the World Bank’s Quantitative Techniques for Health Equity Analysis—
Technical Note # 18 and Quantitative Techniques for Health Equity Analysis—Technical Note # 19 
14 The headcount, H, only captures the incidence of any catastrophes occurring, while the gap, G, also captures the intensity 
of the occurrence. They are related through the mean positive gap which is defined as 
H
G
MPG = . Because this implies , it means that the overall ‘mean catastrophic gap’ equals the fraction with 
catastrophic payments times the mean positive gap.  
MPG H G * =
 
  17and intensity are larger when catastrophe is defined at a lower threshold. As thresholds increase, the 
MPG increases in all countries. It is therefore clear that most of the increase in the MPG is due to a 
modest decline in the mean gap relative to the headcount as the threshold is raised. The ‘catastrophic’ 
effect of health costs manifests itself more as an increase in poverty incidence than a deepening of 
poverty among those who are already poor.  
 
The variation in catastrophic health payments across Balkan countries is also illustrated graphically in 
Figure 1 which shows, for each country, the share of health expenses or out-of-pocket payments 
(OOP) by cumulative percentage of population, ranked by decreasing payment fraction.  
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The horizontal axis in Figure 1 shows the cumulative share of the sample, ordered by the health 
expenditure ratio, beginning with individuals with the smallest ratio, while the vertical axis shows the 
out-of-pocket expenditure as a proportion of total expenditure (and represents any possible threshold 
level). The incidence and intensity is larger in Kosovo and Albania, followed by Serbia, then Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and Montenegro, where the impact is the smallest. Indeed, if the threshold is set at 
10% of the pre-payment income, for instance, the Figure 1 (and Table 8) show that in Kosovo the 
headcount of people spending more than the threshold for health care is around 26% of the sample, in 
Albania around 21%, in Serbia 12%, in Bosnia and Herzegovina 3% and in Montenegro around 1% of 
the population. Moreover, the area under the payment share curve, but above any threshold level, is 
the intensity or mean catastrophic gap, which is largest in Kosovo and Albania and smallest in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and Montenegro for any threshold level
15.  
 
Yet, even in countries with fairly low average catastrophic expenditure shares, the distribution of those 
expenditures can be quite uneven within the country, with segments of the population devoting large 
shares of their consumption expenditure to health care. For example, while Montenegro seems to bear 
the least burden of out-of-pocket payments and many people seem to incur little or no expenditure; a 
few sick individuals have very high expenditure on health care. This can be seen in Table 9 where, for 
                                                 
15 See World Bank Quantitative Techniques for Health Equity Analysis—Technical Note # 18. 
  18all distributions of out-of-pocket health payments as a share of total expenditure, the mean 
substantially exceed the median and the coefficients of variation are large, in particular in Montenegro.  
 
 
Table 9 Out-of-pocket payments for health care (as % of total expenditure) 
  Mean  Median  Coeff. of variation* 
Albania  6% 3% 1.44 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  2%  0%  2.16 
Kosovo 8%  4%  1.33 
Montenegro 1%  0%  2.84 
Serbia 4%  1%  1.96 
*Coefficient of variation is equal to the standard deviation divided by the mean 
 
 
5.3 Effect of out-of-pocket payments on poverty measures 
 
In Table 10, we use another approach to assess the poverty impact of health care payments. It consists 
of comparing the poverty measures before and after health care spending is taken into consideration. 
Given data availability, we use the PA Poverty Lines, calculated in local currency (LCU), by the 
World Bank Poverty Assessment team as national poverty lines. A comparison of poverty headcounts 
and poverty gaps before and after health care spending provides a sense of the impoverishing effect of 
health expenditure, in terms of the additional number of people classified as poor or the deepening 
poverty among the poor
16.  
 
Table 10 shows that health payments increase the number of poor Albanian households from 13% to 
16% of the total population, i.e. poverty headcount increases by 20 percent. The relative impact on the 
measured poverty gap is even larger (34 percent). Looking at differences across countries, overall the 
impact of health expenditure on poverty headcount is not negligible: health payments increase the 
incidence of poverty by 15% in Kosovo, 13% in Serbia, 10% in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 6% in 
Montenegro. Also the after-health-payment poverty gap increases by 28% in Kosovo, 20% in Serbia, 
11% in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 1% in Montenegro. Where the poverty gap after accounting for 
out-of-pocket payments is typically larger than adjustments to the poverty headcount (e.g. in Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia), then health care payments not only raise the prevalence of 
poverty but also its intensity. For purposes of comparison, Table A4 in the Appendix provides 
estimates using the single international poverty line. 
 
The magnitude of these results should be treated with some caution because of potential bias. If poor 
people are less likely to seek care, the after-healthcare-payment headcount may be downward biased; 
on the other hand, if rich people are more likely to be insured, the measure will be upward biased. 
 
While no causal relationship can be inferred from above results, it is undeniable that taking into 
account health care payments notably raises the incidence and intensity of poverty in the Western 
Balkans. The greatest differences are found in Albania and Kosovo, followed by Serbia. Montenegro 
is notable for the degree of financial protection its healthcare system appears to provide.  
 
                                                 
16 See World Bank Quantitative Techniques for Health Equity Analysis—Technical Note # 19. 
 
  19Table 10 Poverty impact of out-of-pocket payments (using PA poverty line) 
   Albania 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina* Montenegro  Serbia  Kosovo 
  Poverty headcount       
1  Pre-payment  headcount  13.40% 17.75% 7.20%  9.37%  40.86% 
2 Post-payment  headcount  16.20% 19.48% 7.60%  10.61% 47.12% 
3  Poverty impact- percentage 
point change (2-1)  2.80% 1.73% 0.40%  1.24%  6.26% 
4 Percentage  change  20.90%  9.75%  5.59%  13.23%  15.32% 
         
  Poverty gaps       
5  Pre-payment poverty gap  138.33  83.16  1.33  76.75  12.40 
6 Post-payment  poverty  gap 185.14  92.03  1.36  91.85  15.82 
7  Poverty impact (5-6) 46.81 8.87  0.03  15.10 3.42 
8  Percentage  change  34% 11% 1%  20% 28% 
*Poverty is measured on annual basis (instead of monthly 
 
6. Probit models of the health-poverty nexus 
 
In this section we carry out a set of country-specific regressions that shed light on the relationship 




In Table 11, we estimate a probit model of the likelihood of being poor as a function of the individual 
health status, medical care utilization and health insurance, controlling for other factors such as 
demographic characteristics, education, ethnicity, and region. The coefficients in the tables that follow 
report the marginal effect  of an infinitesimal change (or discrete change in the case of dummy 
variables) in each independent variable on the outcome probability. Including both health shocks and 
health use in the regression provides an estimate of both the direct effect (cost) of health demand and 
the indirect effect (in terms of forgone earnings) of illness shocks
18. 
 
Results show that the likelihood of poverty is, in general, higher among those who have experienced 
ill health. In both Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the probability of poverty is higher among 
those who have experienced a chronic illness, and in Montenegro and Serbia the probability of poverty 
is higher among those who have experienced acute illness than among those who have not. Also, 
everywhere (except Kosovo where an effect could not be detected), health care utilization and health 
insurance is negatively associated with poverty. This may suggest that having health insurance 
protects households from poverty. However, the signs on these variables could be explained by the 
fact that poor people are more likely to be ill, less likely to seek health care, and less likely to be 
insured. In other words, there is a reverse causality between poverty and health-related variables that 
does not allow us to draw inferential conclusions about the direction of causality of the nexus.  
 
 
                                                 
17 The mean values of main socio-economic control variables are shown in the Appendix, Table A1. 
18 Of course, including both variables does hold its own potential bias, but it is reassuring that excluding health status does 
not lead to different results for the remaining health variables of interest.  
  20Albania Bosnia Montenegro Serbia Kosovo
Chronic illness 0.032 0.07 -0.011 -0.004
(2.67)*** (3.52)*** (0.62) (0.43)
Acute illness 0.016 0.139 0.041
(1.25) (5.98)*** (3.79)***
Health use -0.045 -0.046 0 -0.054 -0.006
(5.94)*** (2.60)*** (2.94)*** (6.84)*** (0.69)
Health insurance -0.022 -0.074 0.088
(2.87)*** (3.31)*** (5.74)***
Age 0.005 -0.001 0.003 0.003 -0.002
(6.90)*** (0.65) (2.52)** (3.93)*** (2.72)***
Age squared 0 0 0 0 0
(6.78)*** (0.4) (2.57)** (3.21)*** (2.59)***
Sex (female) 0.007 -0.01 0.014 -0.001 0.009
(1.04) (0.66) (1.83)* (0.1) (1.12)
N. of infants in the hh (0-5) 0.081 0.097 -0.016 0.027
(18.32)*** (1.27) (2.68)*** (7.97)***
N. of children the hh (6-18) 0.067 0.034 0.099 0.025 0.028
(24.42)*** (2.38)** (1.3) (6.99)*** (12.36)***
N. of adults in the hh (15-64) 0.025 0.041 0.078 0.013 -0.011
(11.65)*** (7.10)*** (1.02) (4.71)*** (5.06)***
N of elderly hh members (65+) 0.017 0.072 0.075 0.043 0.034
(3.24)*** (10.48)*** (0.99) (9.76)*** (5.41)***
Education level (A):
Primary edu.level -0.078 0.015 -0.025 0.048
(6.24)*** (1.02) (2.37)** (1.19)
Secondary edu.level -0.147 -0.022 -0.085 0.049
(11.24)*** (1.34) (6.78)*** (1.19)
Vocational edu.level -0.168 0.006 -0.06 0.06
(12.42)*** (0.3) (2.96)*** (1.36)
University and higher edu.level -0.191 -0.078 -0.089 0.054
(10.97)*** (4.64)*** (7.09)*** (1.24)
Ethnicity (B):





















Other urban 0.097 -0.036 0.095
(6.72)*** (1.81)* (7.54)***
Rural area 0.136 0.066 0.011 0.104 0.032
(11.35)*** (4.02)*** (1.4) (8.50)*** (3.71)***
Observations 15434 2325 8205 7871 15697
Table 11: Probit regression modelling poverty impact of health status and utilization (marginal effects reported)
(C) Tirana is omitted in Albania; city is omitted in Bosnia; Belgrado is omitted in Serbia; urban is omitted in Montenegro 
and Kosovo.
(B) Albanian ethnicity is omitted in Albania; Montenegran in Montenegro; Albanian in Kosovo.
(A) None education is omitted in each country regression.
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
 
  21To further explore the reverse causation between health and poverty, we estimate a model of the 
health-seeking behavior of people living in the Western Balkans, as a function of certain health-related 
variables and a set of socio-economic characteristics. Table 12 presents the results of a probit model of 
health care utilization for the whole population of each Balkan country, and for sub-populations of 
different ages so as to capture age-specific variation in health-related variables.  
 
Not surprisingly, we find that health seeking behavior is positively associated with ill health, i.e. those 
who have experience ill health are more likely to have sought care. Having health insurance also 
significantly increase the person’s probability to seek care (at least for those countries for which 
insurance data are available).  
 
Economic status, as measured by consumption quintiles, is positively and significantly associated with 
the probability of seeking care, and in some cases (such as Albania) the coefficients increase across 
the expenditure quintiles. In other words, a marginal increase in consumption raises the probability of 
using health care over the whole expenditure distribution, but the effect is larger for higher 
expenditure quintiles. This effect does not hold across all age categories, though. Specifically, it 
appears that the lack of economic resources may hamper the care-seeking behavior for children or the 
elderly more than for adults (see, for example the model for Montenegro). Kosovo is the only case 
where we fail to find a significant effect of economic status on health care utilization. Differences in 
health-seeking behavior may also reflect the variation in the availability of health providers across 
regions. People living in rural (remote) and sub-urban regions are less likely to seek care than those in 
the main urban centers. On the other hand, the probability of health care utilization increases with the 
level of education, since the latter may affect both the perception of one’s health status (i.e. one’s 
diagnostic ability) and the ability to access health facilities. Interesting results are also obtained with 
respect to the ethnicity variable, as some ethnic groups seem significantly more or less likely to seek 
care than others. In Albania, for example, elderly Roma are significantly less likely to seek medical 
assistance than the elderly population of other ethnicities. Finally, controlling for all factors, even 






  22Table 12: Probit regression modelling health seeking behaviour (marginal effects reported)
TOT Children (0-15) Adults (16-64) Elderly (65+) TOT Children (0-15) Adults (16-64) Elderly (65+)
Quantiles 2 of pc consumption  0.054 0.081 0.03 0.105 0.041 0.104 0.071 -0.149
(4.42)*** (4.15)*** (1.90)* (2.71)*** (1.45) (0.94) (2.22)** (2.28)**
Quantiles 3 of pc consumption  0.058 0.079 0.048 0.014 0.077 -0.13 0.105 -0.071
(4.56)*** (3.78)*** (2.96)*** (0.35) (2.82)*** (0.75) (3.36)*** (1.24)
Quantiles 4 of pc consumption  0.071 0.093 0.068 -0.005 0.061 -0.603 0.086 -0.062
(4.92)*** (3.71)*** (3.75)*** (0.1) (2.10)** (1.35) (2.61)*** (0.99)
Quantiles 5 of pc consumption  0.098 0.133 0.095 -0.052 0.136 -0.069 0.174 -0.063
(6.03)*** (4.53)*** (4.76)*** (0.97) (4.84)*** (0.35) (5.43)*** (0.97)
Chronic illness 0.437 0.523 0.417 0.439 0.243 0.24 0.239
(30.38)*** (9.64)*** (24.73)*** (15.29)*** (11.49)*** (9.49)*** (6.35)***
Acute illness 0.441 0.583 0.326 0.279
(27.89)*** (23.53)*** (14.01)*** (7.47)***
Age 0.009 -0.026 0.004 0.05 -0.001 -0.003 -0.007
(8.15)*** (3.45)*** (1.79)* (1.37) (0.57) (0.57) (0.12)
Age squared 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 0
(6.56)*** (4.43)*** (1.49) (1.43) (0.13) (0.24) (0.1)
Sex (female) 0.085 0.051 0.114 -0.052 0.164 0.289 0.175 0.11
(9.91)*** (3.65)*** (10.58)*** (1.70)* (9.03)*** (1.68)* (8.27)*** (3.36)***
N. of infants in the hh (0-5) -0.016 -0.03 -0.004 -0.079
(2.59)*** (2.59)*** (0.53) (3.91)***
N. of children the hh (6-18) -0.02 -0.023 -0.014 0.001 -0.005 -0.027 -0.007 0.111
(5.33)*** (3.33)*** (2.92)*** (0.1) (0.3) (0.19) (0.33) (1.95)*
N. of adults in the hh (15-64) -0.019 -0.005 (0.032) -0.007 -0.009 0.005 0.003 -0.051
(6.41)*** (0.97) (8.09)*** (0.66) (1.14) (0.07) (0.32) (4.29)***
N of elderly hh members (65+) -0.022 0.001 -0.037 -0.064 0.014 -0.221 0.026 -0.018
(3.17)*** (0.11) (4.01)*** (2.38)** (1.45) (2.00)** (2.29)** (0.93)
Education level (A):
Primary edu.level 0.082 0.085 0.182 0.089
(4.73)*** (3.09)*** (3.75)*** (2.51)**
Secondary edu.level 0.095 0.123 0.179 -0.031
(4.33)*** (1.54) (3.55)*** (0.34)
Vocational edu.level 0.114 0.287 0.206 0.128
(4.71)*** (1.70)* (4.06)*** (1.99)**
University and higher edu.level 0.169 0.258 0.077
(6.01)*** (4.95)*** (0.82)
Health insurance 0.065 0.068 0.061 0.054 0.102 0.097 0.095
(6.74)*** (4.44)*** (4.91)*** (1.70)* (3.64)*** (3.09)*** (1.44)
Ethnicity (B):
Roma -0.122 -0.079 -0.083
(2.27)** (1.07) (1.14)
Greek 0.328 0.221 0.367 0.273
(7.63)*** (3.00)*** (6.48)*** (3.48)***
Macedonian -0.031 -0.117 0.081 -0.298
(0.42) (1.01) (0.85) (1.12)
Vllahe -0.079 -0.168 -0.067 0.159






Other -0.178 0.22 -0.312 -0.26
(1.88)* (1.12) (2.61)*** (0.87)
No answer
Other urban -0.059 -0.017 -0.062 -0.183 0.024 0.049 0.025 0.023
(4.02)*** (0.71) (3.41)*** (3.50)*** (1.00) (0.63) (0.87) (0.64)
Rural area -0.023 -0.043 -0.001 -0.111 0.011 0.11 0.012 -0.015
(1.61) (1.81)* (0.07) (2.34)** (0.55) (1.26) (0.49) (0.43)
Observations 15535 4397 9732 1405 2325 28 1813 482
Albania Bosnia
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TOT Children (0-15) Adults (16-64) Elderly (65+) TOT Children (0-15) Adults (16-64) Elderly (65+)
Quantiles 2 of pc consumption  0.015 0.045 0.009 -0.017 0.026 0.057 0.02 0.013
(1.57) (3.14)*** (0.72) (0.44) (1.36) (1.24) (0.82) (0.33)
Quantiles 3 of pc consumption  0.037 0.048 0.038 -0.04 0.121 0.158 0.106 0.104
(3.67)*** (3.13)*** (2.75)*** (1.08) (6.08)*** (3.34)*** (4.24)*** (2.60)***
Quantiles 4 of pc consumption  0.014 0.003 0.011 0.019 0.114 0.148 0.099 0.1
(1.38) (0.19) (0.85) (0.45) (5.58)*** (2.99)*** (3.94)*** (2.30)**
Quantiles 5 of pc consumption  0.102 0.148 0.096 -0.038 0.164 0.246 0.139 0.097
(7.93)*** (5.77)*** (5.70)*** (0.95) (7.61)*** (4.67)*** (5.31)*** (1.92)*
Chronic illness 0.135 0.05 0.224 -0.005 0.425 0.47 0.42 0.416
(10.18)*** (2.52)** (10.96)*** (0.2) (25.18)*** (5.57)*** (19.91)*** (15.05)***
Acute illness 0.499 0.51 0.472 0.561 0.428 0.619 0.413 0.288
(26.21)*** (13.59)*** (18.38)*** (12.38)*** (23.71)*** (12.41)*** (17.81)*** (9.33)***
Age 0.001 -0.012 -0.001 0.029 -0.006 -0.028 -0.004 0
(0.79) (3.08)*** (0.99) (0.8) (4.03)*** (1.96)** (1.17) (0)
Age squared 0 0.001 0 0 0 0.001 0 0
(0.29) (2.34)** (1.62) (0.69) (4.23)*** (1.54) (1.38) (0.02)
Sex (female) 0.009 0.008 0.006 -0.031 0.102 0.041 0.131 0.095
(1.68)* (1.11) (0.87) (1.19) (8.56)*** (1.45) (9.12)*** (3.15)***
N. of infants in the hh (0-5) -0.018 -0.01 -0.012 -0.353 -0.008 -0.055 -0.011 0.045
(1.02) (0.12) (0.7) (2.35)** (0.78) (2.09)** (0.81) (1.41)
N. of children the hh (6-18) -0.02 -0.003 -0.015 -0.415 -0.023 -0.027 -0.014 -0.04
(1.15) (0.04) (0.85) (2.79)*** (3.17)*** (1.38) (1.64) (2.11)**
N. of adults in the hh (15-64) -0.023 -0.008 -0.019 -0.385 -0.006 -0.009 0.005 -0.02
(1.34) (0.1) (1.06) (2.57)** (1.2) (0.61) (0.71) (1.96)**
N of elderly hh members (65+) -0.025 -0.009 -0.026 -0.369 -0.02 0 -0.028 -0.028
(1.48) (0.11) (1.45) (2.45)** (2.23)** (0.01) (2.42)** (1.12)
Education level (A):
Primary edu.level 0.027 0.017 0.026 -0.04 0.014 -0.024 0.065 0.067
(2.32)** (1.31) (0.84) (1.34) (0.63) (0.6) (1.04) (1.85)*
Secondary edu.level 0.015 -0.008 -0.01 0.118 0.043 0.091 0.131
(1.26) (0.36) (0.38) (2.82)*** (1.64) (1.47) (2.64)***
Vocational edu.level 0.043 -0.03 0.006 0.279 -0.002 0.022 0.101
(2.90)*** (0.63) (0.22) (4.94)*** (0.05) (0.27) (1.14)
University and higher edu.level 0.001 -0.016 -0.023 0.036 0.064 0.247
(0.05) (0.64) (0.56) (1.07) (0.95) (4.02)***
Health insurance 0.039 0.026 0.016 0.062
(4.21)*** (2.03)** (1.03) (2.04)**
Ethnicity (B):
Roma 0.093 0.08 0.083 -0.087








Serb -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.067
(1.67)* (1.14) (1.38) (3.02)***
Moslem -0.006 -0.016 -0.005 0.165
(0.58) (1.18) (0.36) (2.14)**
Turk
Other
No answer -0.006 0.034 -0.013 -0.081
(0.57) (1.97)** (0.91) (2.59)***
Other urban 0.001 -0.007 -0.01 0.094
-0.08 (0.17) (0.5) (2.33)**
Rural area 0.003 -0.001 0.009 -0.06 -0.068 -0.042 -0.085 0.038
(0.59) (0.15) (1.29) (2.65)*** (3.98)*** (1.04) (4.16)*** (0.92)
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TOT Children (0-15) Adults (16-64) Elderly (65+)
Quantiles 2 of pc consumption  -0.005 -0.016 -0.004 0.046
(0.49) (1.04) (0.26) (1.00)
Quantiles 3 of pc consumption  -0.001 0 -0.017 0.101
(0.11) (0.02) (1.14) (2.16)**
Quantiles 4 of pc consumption  -0.011 -0.016 -0.022 0.07
(0.98) (0.94) (1.44) (1.43)
Quantiles 5 of pc consumption  0.012 -0.007 0.007 0.078
(1.00) (0.36) (0.43) (1.41)
Chronic illness
Acute illness
Age 0.005 0.003 0.014 -0.096
(8.94)*** (0.59) (6.53)*** (2.76)***
Age squared 0 0 0 0.001
(4.14)*** (0.82) (4.46)*** (2.62)***
Sex (female) -0.012 0.01 -0.016 -0.037
(1.68)* (0.87) (1.71)* (1.17)
N. of infants in the hh (0-5) 0.005 -0.01 0.003 0.011
(1.56) (2.07)** (0.69) (0.7)
N. of children the hh (6-18) -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.022
(2.28)** (0.8) (1.49) (2.23)**
N. of adults in the hh (15-64) -0.006 0.008 -0.013 0.008
(3.55)*** (2.79)*** (5.25)*** (0.93)
N of elderly hh members (65+) -0.007 0.008 -0.022 0.148
(1.18) (0.96) (2.79)*** (5.13)***
Education level (A):
Primary edu.level 0.02 -0.036 0.108 0.975
(0.54) (0.85) (1.76)* (1.39)
Secondary edu.level 0.021 -0.042 0.118 0.981
(0.57) (1.02) (1.80)* (1.43)
Vocational edu.level 0.085 -0.025 0.187 0.802
(2.03)** (0.51) (2.61)*** (1.5)
University and higher edu.level 0.027 -0.063 0.12 0.806
(0.66) (1.37) (1.72)* (1.48)
Health insurance
Ethnicity (B):
Roma -0.01 -0.017 0.009 -0.069




Croatian 0.259 0.55 0.201 0.317
(3.31)*** (2.47)** (2.19)** (1.41)
Yugoslav 0.073
(0.22)
Serb -0.006 -0.011 -0.005 -0.033
(0.47) (0.4) (0.3) (0.73)
Moslem -0.024 -0.053 -0.028 0.022
(0.98) (1.11) (0.85) (0.29)
Turk -0.06 -0.023 -0.09 -0.108





Rural area 0.001 0.01 0.001 -0.025
(0.18) (0.86) (0.07) (0.79)
Observations 15697 5235 9425 1034
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Kosovo
 
  256. Conclusions and implications for policy 
 
In this paper we used data from household surveys to examine the relationship between health, health 
care utilization, out-of-pocket payments and poverty in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo. Most of these governments have either initiated or are contemplating 
reforms of the heath sector. From a policy perspective, a key concern is the effect of household 
expenditures on poverty, and the extent to which such payments act as a barrier to health care 
utilization. 
 
Our descriptive and inferential analyses have shown that there are significant differences in health-
care utilization rates across socio-economic groups and that these differences are related to both 
geographical location and economic status. Private out-of-pocket health care payments are 
burdensome and appear to discourage health care seeking behavior, especially among the poor. The 
data suggest that the health care payments made by the poor are made up primarily of official 
payments (for inpatient and outpatient care) and, then, by transportation costs (which are particularly 
high in Serbia and Kosovo) and informal payments. Informal payments are higher in rural or remote 
regions, where they probably compensate for lower salaries or inefficient local public expenditure. 
 
Private out-of-pocket expenditure on health care appears to increase the incidence of poverty and push 
poor households into deeper poverty. Our findings show that the financial impact of out-of-pocket 
payments appears to be greatest in Albania and Kosovo. In Albania, where more than 60 percent of 
health care costs are paid out-of-pocket by households and only one third comes from public spending, 
we find that after accounting for out-of-pocket payments to finance health care, the headcount poverty 
ratio increases by 27% and the poverty gap by 36%. The same is true for Serbia, where despite the fact 
that health insurance is compulsory, the poverty impact of health payments is far from negligible: 
health-related expenses increase the incidence of poverty by 17% and while the burden of health care 
expenditure seems to be fairly similar across the income distribution, high transportation costs may 
have a significant impact on health seeking behaviour. In Kosovo, where the health system is tax-
funded, we find that healthcare expenses represent 13 percent of the total consumption of the poor 
compared to 4 percent among the richest. Health care utilization is fairly high, households pay more or 
less the same for health care across the income distribution and, unlike in other places, in Kosovo the 
results from the regression analysis show that economic status is not significant in shaping health care 
demand. This could be the result of relative equity in access to health care and relative inequality in 
the  ex-ante or pre-payment income distribution (as can be observed from the net expenditure 
distribution by quintiles)
19. Finally, Bosnia and Herzegovina and, especially, Montenegro seem more 
able to provide households with financial protection against illness. However, in Montenegro the 
incidence of illness and is low, as are health care utilization rates. Therefore, while on the one hand the 
health system seems to offers greater financial protection, this result may be affected by a smaller 
demand for health care. 
 
As countries in the sub-region continue the process of health system reform, one area that will have to 
receive attention is how to protect vulnerable groups from the impoverishing effects of health care 
expenditure. The reform process will necessarily be different for every country. Some areas that could 
be considered include revisiting the user fee structure – both its design and implementation – to 
consider different exemption criteria, the progressivity of co-payment schedules and the interaction 
between formal and informal payments; examining the constraints on the expansion of health 
insurance to uncovered groups, such as agricultural workers and the informally employed; ensuring a 
more equitable geographic distribution of healthcare facilities or subsidizing transport for the rural 
poor so as to reduce the high transportation costs; and exploring the potential role of private sector 
providers and insurers in expanding access to care. Protecting households from the impoverishing 
effects of adverse health events is a key objective of health systems in all countries and to achieve it 
                                                 
19 It is worth bearing in mind that the data used for Kosovo in this paper were collected in 2000 during a period of great 
political volatility before the Ministry of Health was established (February 2002).  
  26within the constraint of ensuring financial sustainability will require more efficient use of available 
public and private resources.  
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Table A1 Summary statistics for individual and household characteristics 
          
 Albania 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Kosovo Monetenegro Serbia 
Age 30.82  42.30  27.32  27.86  38.32 
No. of infants in the hh (0-5)  0.53  0.00  1.23  1.06  0.32 
No. of children the hh (6-18)  1.48  0.26  2.29  2.09  0.81 
No. of adults in the hh (15-64)  3.28  3.04  4.37  5.18  2.92 
No. of elderly hh members (65+) 0.45  1.26  0.44  0.67  0.60 
Female 50%  50.30%  50.73%  49.60%  50.89% 
Region of living:           
Capital city  11.84%  52.47%  37.58%  64.97%  19.72% 
Other urban  28.21%  15.85%      37.46% 
Rural 59.95%  31.68%  62.42%  35.03%  42.83% 
Education level:           
None 15.74%  11.60%  1.07%  21.94%  14.83% 
Primary 55.88%  15.49%  59.65%  19.10%  36.11% 
Secondary 13.62%  57.02%  29.06%  28.14%  38.77% 
Vocational 9.86%  1.05%  4.89%  13.16%  1.86% 
Higher 4.89%  13.22%  5.34%  17.67%  8.43% 
Ethnicity:          
Albanian 97.43%    88.12%     
Greek 1.08%         
Bosnian   35.80%       
Serbian   38.51%  6.97%  29.98%   
Croatian   22.84%    1.48%   
Muslim     1.92%  6.60%   
Roma     1.68%  4.86%   
Montenegran       49.64%   
Turk     1.00%     
 
 Table A2 Variations in the definition of concepts across the LSMS surveys   




Montenegro (2004)  Serbia (2003)  Kosovo (2000) 
Chronic illness 
Do you suffer from a 
chronic illness or 
disability that has 
lasted more than 3 
months (including 
severe depression)? 
Do you have any 
chronic diseases? 
Do you have chronic 
diseases? 
Has doctor told you 




During the last 4 
weeks have you had 
any (sudden) illness or 
injury? (such as flu, 
diarrhea, a fracture, 
etc..) 
na 
Did you have any 
acute symptom, 
diseases or injury in 
the last 30 days? 
Did you have any 
acute symptom, 






During the past 4 
weeks, did you visit 
any … (list of medical 
services)? 
During the last 14 
months how many 
times did you visit 
(list of medical 
services)? 
During the last 30 
days have you 
consulted with health 
practitioner or 
visited a health 
facility? (list of first 





public and private 
medical services) 
…during last month? 
During the past 4 
weeks, did you 
visit any… (list of 
medical services) 




During the past 12 
months, have you 
stayed in a hospital or 
maternity, hospital or 
a private clinic in 
Albania or abroad? 
During the past 14 
months, did you 
stay in hospital or 
spa? 
na 
Did you stay in 
hospital in the last 12 
months? 
During the past 12 
months, have you 







Do you have a health 
license? 
Do you have health 
insurance? 
Are you covered by 
health insurance 
either directly or 
through another 
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Table A3 Type of health care utilization by poverty status using international poverty lines (%) 
  Albania  Bosnia and Herzegovina  Montenegro  Serbia 
 Non-poor  Poor  Non-poor  Poor  Non-poor Poor  Non-poor Poor 
Public ambulatory  9.56*** 7.92***  35.08  0.00***  70.19  64.51  22.21 18.48 
Hospital (outpatient)  3.52 3.64  na  na  na na na Na 
Popular doctor/alternative medicine  0.36* 0.17*  2.16 0.00***  na na 0.99 0.21 
Private doctor  1.36 1.02  7.48  0  3.39  0.58  2.23*** 0.00*** 
Private nurse  1.38 1.39  0.59  0.00***  1.08  0.00  na  Na 
Health service abroad  Na Na  na na  na na 0.12 0.00 
Other  Na Na  14.62 0.00*** 3.88  0.00  na Na 
Non-prescription medicines  16.04*** 12.59***  41.78  0.00***  0.02**  0.01**  21.59*** 7.66*** 
Hospital (inpatient)*  3.96 4.34  4.79  0.00***  21.46**  34.91**  5.03 3.04 
Dentist  21.66*** 11.73***  26.44  0.00***  0.02***  0.00***  7.20*** 1.64*** 
Have health insurance  39.36*** 28.00***  59.28***  0.00***  94.86***  98.72***  na Na 
International pov line 
4785.45 
New Lek/pc /per month 
863.225 
KM/pc/ per year 
 
82.13 
euro/pc/ per month 
3124.115 
Dinars/ad. equiv/ per month 
Note: *In Montenegro, the data include outpatient care at hospitals. 







Table A4 Poverty impact of out-of-pocket payments (using international poverty lines) 
   Albania 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina* Montenegro  Serbia 
  Poverty headcount      
1 Pre-payment  headcount  10.30%  0.15%  5.00%  3.16% 
2 Post-payment  headcount  13.10% 0.20%  5.08%  3.87% 
3  Poverty impact- percentage 
point  change  (2-1)  2.80% 0.05% 0.08% 0.71% 
4 Percentage  change  27.18%  33.33%  1.60%  22.47% 
        
  Poverty gaps      
5  Pre-payment poverty gap  96.53  0.27  0.82  16.98 
6 Post-payment  poverty gap  132.29  0.36  0.84  21.58 
7  Poverty impact (5-6)  35.76  0.09  0.02  4.60 
8 Percentage  change  37%  33%  2%  27% 
*Poverty is measured on annual basis (instead of monthly).   
 
 
 